Abstract: The goals of this research are to appraise the ROK's conventional deterrence posture and to find a few prerequisites in enhancing its effect. For this, I test the ROK's deterrence posture employing six independent variables. According to research results, the conflicts between the two Koreas were international conflicts rather than a kind of civil war, so, they were not usually solved by the individual nations themselves. This situation shows the complexity of any conflict between the two Koreas that originates in its geostrategic location surrounded by the four great powers. This unfavorable situation positively coincides with deterrence theory as in a state of mutual deterrence. Under this security environment, the DPRK consistently commits small scale conventional provocations. In deterring these kinds of provocations, the prerequisites for the success of the ROK's conventional deterrence are to establish the mind-set of its population, to create a new counter-provocation phase for middle intensity conflicts and to revise a practical Armistice Rules of Engagement.